Wildfires present a growing risk to many countries, and climate change is likely to exacerbate this risk. This study analyzes how people directly affected by a wildfire understand its causes and consequences, as well as the future risk of wildfires. The point of departure is that social understanding of wildfires has an important influence on the consequences that emerge in the wake of a wildfire. The empirical case analyzed here is the largest forest fire in modern Swedish history, and the material basis of the study is a postal survey to all individuals directly affected by the fire. The results revealed a complex picture of the respondents' understanding of the wildfire. Even if the fire was human caused, there was little blame toward forest companies and fire departments. Many positive consequences, such as a long-term increase in biodiversity, were attached to the disaster, and there was a belief that organizations will learn from it and take action to limit wildfires in the future. Simultaneously, the majority of the respondents believed that climate change may lead to an increased risk of forest fires in the future. These findings illustrate the complexity of people's perceptions of the fire and its aftermath.
Introduction
Wildfires present a growing risk to many countries. Even if they are the most common and severe in North America, southern Europe, and Australia, wildfires are a growing issue for many other countries as well (Paton et al. 2015; Tedim et al. 2015) . Wildfire suppression and damage from fires have led to mounting economic costs and social constraints in recent decades (Mockrin et al. 2015) . Because of climate change, wildland fires will probably increase in frequency, intensity, and area burned (IPCC 2014; Tedim et al. 2016) . These threats are particularly high for boreal forests that are expected to be subject to increasingly severe climate-driven disturbances, particularly at the wildland-urban interface (Westerling et al. 2006; Flannigan et al. 2009; Stephens et al. 2013; Moritz et al. 2014; Abatzoglou and Williams 2016) . Furthermore, "megafires" -wildfires that overwhelm the capacity and endurance of available firefighting resources -have become increasingly common in Europe since the early 1990s, and their frequency is expected to further increase in the future due to climate change (Tedim et al. 2016) . Studies also stress that managing a wildfire does not end when the fire is extinguished, as long-term social and ecological concerns need to be addressed (Vallejo and Alloza 2015; Tedim et al. 2016) . Thus, wildfires are a growing global problem, making it important to generate more knowledge about this phenomenon -both to prevent their occurrence and to minimize their consequences.
The consequences of wildfires for society are unevenly distributed and of different types. Paveglio et al. (2015) suggest three different types of consequences: (i) loss of life, destruction of property and economic loss; (ii) disruption of social processes and functions; and (iii) local perceptions of and reactions to the fire's impacts. These consequences can be geographically restricted or spread out and can be of short or long duration. Indirect effects (often labeled "secondary consequences") further complicate the picture (Power 2007) . Studies of environmental disasters have shown that many of the consequences of a disaster are caused in the aftermath of disasters. Those could be environmental consequences caused by governmental demands on rapid clearance of a forest storm area that resulted in a lack of environmental considerations during the clearing and reprocessing work (Lidskog and Sjödin 2016a) . There could be social consequences in terms of a community torn apart by litigation processes (Freudenberg 2000; Picou et al. 2004) or by public mistrust towards agencies and companies caused by poorly organized recovery work (Erikson 1995; Hood 2011) fueled by media logics reinforcing a blame game (Pidgeon et al. 2003 ). There could be economic consequences in terms of consumer boycotts and bad-will campaigns towards a company seen as responsible for the disaster (Wang et al. 2018 ). In the case for wildfires, external assistance is often welcomed but may also fuel disagreements and conflicts among affected community members Carroll et al. 2006) as well as negatively influence efforts to mitigate future wildfires (McCaffrey 2015; Edgeley and Paveglio 2017) .
The secondary consequences of a disaster are strongly affected by the ways in which actors perceive the disaster and respond to it. Psychological, social and institutional processes can amplify a disaster, resulting in unforeseen consequences (Kasperson et al. 1988) . For example, a fire disaster can result in changed legislation, new conditions for forest insurance, consumer boycotts of a company's products, or decreased institutional confidence in the forest sector. This means that organizations may have to handle long-term impacts of the affected people, community recovery, and enduring distrust among a much wider circle of people and organizations than those directly affected (Lidskog 2016) . Large-scale disasters or those that become well-known through media may be seen as archetypal, revealing how society values people, activities and sectors, and pointing to the inherent risks strongly associated with particular activities (Erikson 1995) . Thus, a wildfire that heavily influences a community may cause distrust of governments and corporations and may foster social tensions.
Recent research on the social aspects of wildfires has directed attention to risk management (Calkin et al. 2014) ; attitudes toward pre-fire mitigation and adaptation (Lidskog and Sjödin 2016b) ; management networks, coordination and collaboration (Bergström et al. 2016; Bodin and Nohrstedt 2016) ; community engagement and voluntary involvement in forest fire management (Eckerberg and Buizer 2017; Johansson et al. 2018) ; fire management options (Flannigan et al. 2009 ); forest owners' preparedness (Valente et al. 2015) ; and post-fire recovery and assistance to disaster victims (Holmes 2010; Taylor et al. 2014) . Studies have also focused on the social and economic impacts on affected communities (Ager et al. 2010) , local preparedness , community recovery following wildfires , risk perception (Langer and McGee 2017; Velez et al. 2017) , media coverage (Berglez and Lidskog 2018) and media usage of metaphors (Matlock et al. 2017) . Several studies have recognized the importance of local contexts (Abrams et al. 2015; Kulig and Botey 2016; Paveglio et al. 2016; Paveglio and Edgeley 2017) .
Studies have also shown that people's wildfire-related beliefs are significant for the demands they place on responsible organizations as well as for their own wildfire mitigation behaviors (Dickinson et al. 2015) . It is therefore important to investigate how people understand wildfires: their causes, consequences, and how to mitigate them. Forest fires are expected to become a more frequent phenomenon making it even more important to gain knowledge about different aspects of wildfires, including the social implications for those affected.
The urgent need for knowledge motivated the current study, which analyzes a particular case: the largest wildfire in Sweden, which occurred in 2014. No single wildfire has resulted in such a large burned area (in total, 15,000 hectares). Even if the total burned area of the wildfires in the summer of 2018 was larger (in total, 25,000 hectares), the burned area was caused by some 60 wildfires at different places (For a summary of the 2018 wildfires and the firefighting and crisis management, see MSB 2018; SFA 2018; SFOR 2018) .
The aim of this paper is to analyze the affected people's understanding of the 2014 wildfire in Sweden. Five questions guided the analysis: (i) How did the affected people perceive the causes of the wildfire? (ii) What consequences did the affected people attach to the wildfire? (iii) How did the affected people evaluate the work of the organizations involved during the fire? (iv) What did the affected people believe would be learned from the wildfire? (v) What did the affected people believe about the future risk of wildfires? These questions were explored through a postal survey to all people directly affected by the fire. In the concluding section of this paper, we relate our results to other findings, not least public investigations of the wildfire.
Materials and methods
The case: the 2014 wildfire in Sweden
In summer 2014, Sweden experienced the largest forest fire in its modern history, covering an area of 14,000 hectares in four municipalities. A large forest company had hired a local subcontractor to perform subsoiling, and on July 31, a forest vehicle ignited a fire. The weather had been extremely hot, and it had not rained for weeks, which caused the fire to spread rapidly; two fire departments (from different municipalities) had to fight the fire separately. However, on the fifth day, the fire went completely out of control, spreading from 2800 to 13,000 hectares, and for the first time, it was perceived by the authorities as a major crisis. This led to a reorganization of the operations, involving governmental agencies as well as fire and rescue services from other parts of Sweden. Firefighting aircraft from France and Italy also water bombed the fire. Eight days after it broke out, the wildfire was brought under control (most of the above-ground fire was put out), mainly due to changes in the weather. Six weeks later (September 11), it was formally declared as extinguished.
In total, 2300 people -police officers, soldiers, firefighters, forestry workers and volunteers -were mobilized to fight the fire and evacuate people and animals. The damage caused by the fire was considerable: there was one fatality; over 1000 people and 1700 animals (cattle and sheep) were evacuated; 71 buildings were damaged or destroyed; 15,000 hectares were burned and 1.4 million cubic meters of timber damaged; and three nature reserves and ten habitat protection areas and nature conservation agreements were affected. The total cost of the fire is estimated to be at least 100 million euros (CAB 2014; MSB 2015) . The burned area is owned by approximately 100 small-scale private landowners and a handful of large forest companies and organizations. In spring 2015, almost half of the area (6400 hectares) was declared a nature reserve, with the state offering either economic compensation or a new forest property in the vicinity for those owning forest in the newly established nature reserve. The economic consequences of the fire disaster were mixed (Lidskog and Sjödin 2018) . Many of the affected forest owners (about 75%) had fire insurance that covered their economic losses. Similarly, the ecological consequences were mixed; the fire was detrimental for the area with damaged forest and loss of environmental values (e.g. the area had ten registered key biotopes as well as 16 objects with natural values), but from a long-term perspective, by establishing the nature reserve, there will probably be more, not less, biodiversity in the area.
Survey
The study was based on a postal survey sent to all people directly affected by the 2014 wildfire in the region of Väst-manland, Sweden. Directly affected persons fell into four categories: permanent residents; summer cottagers; forest owners; and evacuees (both those who actually were evacuated and those asked by public authorities to be prepared to evacuate). The survey was distributed in March 2015 (7 months after the fire) by Statistics Sweden (the governmental agency responsible for producing official statistics but which also conducts surveys for customers) to all adults (18 years or older), and the participants were guaranteed confidentiality. No compensation was given to the participants. This sample consisted of 960 individuals, and, after two reminders by letter, the response rate was 78% (746 respondents). The survey included a total of 133 questions. The themes covered in the survey concerned both general views on forest fires in Sweden and views on the particular wildfire in 2014 (such as causes of the fire; ecological, economic and social consequences of the fire; and evaluation of the work of organizations involved during the fire and whether respondents' trust in these organizations had changed because of the fire). Each question was answered on a 5-point scale ranging from "agree completely" to "completely disagree". In addition, "don't know" was an alternative. In the analysis, the table has merged the scale into three alternatives: agree (consisting of "agree completely" and "agree to a large extent"), partly agree (consisting of "partly agree") and disagree (consisting of "agree to a small extent" and "completely disagree").
Analytical approach and research questions
When facing an unfamiliar situation, people and organizations have to develop a sense of what they are up against and what they have to do (Weick et al. 2009 ). An extreme event is made understandable though frames, i.e. structures of belief, values, perception and appreciation through which actors reduce the complexity of an issue to support a certain understanding (Schön and Rein 1994: 23) . A frame condenses large amounts of information and assumptions about a disaster but also assigns meanings to it, including claims about what caused the disaster and what must be done to reduce its consequences as well as to prevent similar disasters from happening in the future.
The five research questions in this study address the sense making surrounding a particular wildfire disaster and the understanding of wildfires in general. The questions are based on important framing themes that have been found in disaster studies (Edelstein 1988; Erikson 1995; Freudenberg 2000; Dynes and Rodrigues 2007) .
Causes
The first research question concerned the respondents' general understanding of the causes of the wildfire disaster. Whereas both natural and human-made disasters may have far-reaching consequences, issues of blame and responsibility are often brought forth in cases of human-made disasters (Erikson 1995; Freudenberg et al. 2012 . Cf. Löfmarck et al. 2017 . Additionally, human-made disasters risk creating distrust towards organizations and sectors that are perceived to have caused the disaster, as well as towards regulatory bodies that have not been able to stop the disaster (Freudenberg 2000; Picou et al. 2004 ).
Consequences
The second research question concerned the respondents' understanding of the consequences of the disaster. Information about these consequences is often mediated by mass media and social media (Berglez and Lidskog 2018) . The consequences that are amplified (or attenuated) are crucial to the further handling of a particular disaster and may also substantially affect the broader public view of a particular sector (Pidgeon et al. 2003) . We focused on personal consequences as well as general positive consequences, as much media coverage in the aftermath of the wildfire framed it as a "happy disaster", i.e. a disaster that had substantially fewer severe consequences than initially assumed but also to have a number of unforeseen positive consequences (Lidskog and Sjödin 2018) .
Organizational efforts
The third research question concerned the respondents' evaluations of the involved organizations' work during the fire. Forest fires are common, but in most cases, they are prevented from becoming large-scale events. Regulations and codes of conduct have been designed to prevent unforeseen events from developing into disasters, and therefore, a crucial public issue is why the responsible organizations were not able to manage the situation (Freudenberg et al. 2012) . Studies have also shown that the affected people's perceptions of and experiences with how organizations work are important for their general evaluation of a disaster as well as their trust or distrust in a sector (Gouldson et al. 2007 ).
Learning opportunities
The fourth research question concerned the respondents' belief that organizations will learn from the wildfire. Studies have shown that disasters can facilitate learning (Toft and Reynolds 2005; Weick et al. 2009 ). Learning opportunities are created because a disaster often destabilizes many beliefs and activities that have become routinized and habitual, questioning previous decisions, organizational routines and professional practices (Boin and 't Hart 2007) . However, disasters may be framed as unique events, creating the impression that there is little to be learned from them (Lidskog and Sjödin 2016b) . From the perspective of the people affected, a crucial question is whether the responsible organizations involved take responsibility for learning from the wildfire, as that learning may also lead to organizational change (e.g. improved ability to prevent, mitigate and manage forest fires).
Future risk
The fifth research question concerned the respondents' beliefs about the future risk of forest fires and possible factors underlying this development. An important factor affecting the general trust or distrust in a particular activity, branch or sector is to what extent similar disasters are expected to happen in the future. Whether a particular disaster is perceived as archetypal -revealing a real risk associated with an activity or sector -or as a unique exception that will probably never happen again leads to different public responses and demands for regulatory improvements (Erikson 1995; Birkland 2006) . Additionally, views about the future risk of forest fires also include conceptions about the causes behind an increased, decreased or stable level of risk.
Statistical tests
A descriptive and bivariate analysis was conducted using SPSS software. Univariate analysis comprised analysis of frequency tables of relevant variables, including the missing categories. Bivariate analysis comprised cross tabulations of variables. A principal component factor analysis with Varimax rotation was also conducted ( Table 2 ). The analysis yielded a twofactor solution, where one factor indicates respondents blaming forestry for the disaster, and the other indicates respondents blaming the response to the fire. This study is a census of all individuals directly affected by the fire; therefore, the results should only be generalized to this population of directly affected individuals.
Results

Perceived causes of the wildfire
The respondents tended to perceive the wildfire as manmade (Table 1) . Of all the 746 respondents, 52% agreed with the statement that fire could have been completely avoided, and 68% agreed with the statement that the severity of the fire could have been reduced. At the same time, 68% agreed with the statement that because of weather conditions, humans had limited possibilities to control the fire. Of those who agreed that the fire was unstoppable, 73% also agreed with the statement that the severity of the disaster could have been avoided (Table 2) .
The results showed that the respondents believed that the wildfire could have been avoided, but what or whom did the respondents blame for the fire? Five survey questions concerned the role of actors in causing the wildfire disaster (Table 1) , and 16-25% gave no answer (NA) or responded "don't know" (DK) to these questions, indicating uncertainty about the causes of the disaster. There was also a relatively high proportion of respondents who partly agreed with these five statements about actors' roles in causing the disaster, which indicated that they held a multicausal view rather than blaming a single actor or activity. While 60% agreed with the statement that it was the forest company's activities that ignited the fire, a considerably smaller proportion (24%) blamed forestry practices in general. Of all respondents, 42% agreed that coordination problems between local authorities led to the disastrous outcome of the fire, and 36% blamed the disaster on deficiencies in the local fire departments. Finally, 30% agreed that the wildfire became so severe because of major mistakes made by single individuals.
The principal component factor analysis (Table 2) shows that the question about weather conditions loads approximately the same to both factors of avoidability and unstoppability (0.41 and 0.48). The two factors explain 51.6% of the variation.
Consequences of the wildfire
Almost two-thirds of respondents stated that they experienced personal losses because of the wildfire (Table 3) . However, the most common response is that the fire did not cause any personal loss at all (29%), and among the fire's negative effects, the main consequence is recreational (such as loss of places to go berry picking and fishing). Furthermore, a very small proportion of the respondents state that the fire caused them severe economic loss (6%).
The respondents had mixed understanding of the general consequences of the fire (Table 4) . Although a majority (52%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement that forest fires are a good thing as long as people, animals and buildings are protected, they acknowledged several positive side effects. They tended to agree with the statements that as a result of the fire, biodiversity will increase in the affected area (55%), local fire departments will improve their capacity to fight wildfires (52%), local municipalities will be better prepared to handle fires (46%), people will care more for each other (43%), social cohesion will increase (40%) and Swedish forestry will be more resilient in the face of forest fires in the future (34%). Less than 20% (6-19%) disagreed with these statements, even though the proportion that answered "don't know" tended to be high.
Evaluations of efforts during the fire
Respondents had the most positive attitudes towards efforts made by volunteer organizations and the local fire departments (evaluated as "good" by 89% and 85%, respectively; Table 5 ). Respondents also tend to believe that the local municipalities worked well (evaluated as "good" by 56%; Table 5 ). Furthermore, there was a tendency to respond that the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the County Administrative Board performed well (45% and 44%, respectively), even though many responded "don't know" (29% and 25%, respectively). However, relatively few respondents thought that the forest companies and the Swedish Forest Agency did a good job (22% and 19%, respectively), but again, a large number responded "don't know" (37% and 50%, respectively). The proportion answering that they do not know was lower for organizations at the local level.
Learning from the fire
Respondents attached many positive consequences to the fire (Table 4) , including the assumption that the fire had triggered learning among the involved organizations, the affected communities and the forest sector at large, resulting in increased fire management preparedness and a less vulnerable forest. Respondents tended to have a high level of confidence that the fire departments will improve their ability to fight forest fires (66% high confidence; Table 6 ). They had the lowest confidence in the forest companies taking responsibility to reduce forest-fire risk (30% low or no confidence; Table 6 ). Of the respondents, 30-35% had a high level of confidence that the Swedish state, the forestry agency or local authorities will learn from the wildfire and improve their capacity to prevent or mitigate forest fires.
Wildfire risk in general
Concerning the general risk of forest fires in the future, the respondents were asked if the risk of forest fires had increased in recent years and whether it will increase in the next 10 or 50 years (Table 7) . The results indicated high uncertainty, with "DK" or "NA" chosen by 35-39% of the respondents, although many (25-27%) also considered that the risk has increased and will increase. The respondents were more certain that it is possible to minimize the risk of forest fires (43% believed that to be the case, 14% disagreed, and 14% did not know).
The respondents tended to agree or partly agree with the statement that there was an increased risk of large forest fires in the coming decade (47% agreed or partly agreed, 16% disagreed). At the same time, 72% agreed or partly agreed that it is possible to minimize the risk of forest fires. The respondents believed that global warming (60% agreed or partly agreed, 17% disagreed) and forest companies' activities (58% agreed or partly agreed, 17% disagreed) may result in forests that are more vulnerable to wildfires (Table 7) . The respondents simultaneously associated current forestry practices in Sweden with less risk (47% agreed or partly agreed, 25% disagreed). The respondents did not consider the mistakes made by the local fire departments to be a cause of large forest fires (49% disagreed and 38% agreed or partly agreed).
Discussion
Wildfires is a growing issue that is subject to international debate, and forestry practices and regulations need to change to make forests less fire prone and less vulnerable to climate change. It is therefore important to gain knowledge of public attitudes towards forestry, which, in turn, might generate political incentives to oversee these issues and change regulations and legislation. Our study provides case-specific knowledge that can help to understand the complex and dynamic interactions during a wildfire, the meanings attached to it, and trust in organizations and regulations at a more general level.
Perceived causes of the wildfire
We first addressed the perceptions of the causes of the fire. Most respondents believed that the fire was started by a forest company's activities, but there were other actors that were responsible for making the wildfire as severe as it became. This view is in line with the public investigations of the wildfire, which raised severe criticisms towards both the forest sector and the firefighting and emergency services; both of these sectors failed to sufficiently assess the risk of the fire growing and becoming large scale (Henningsson and Jacobsen 2014; Sjökvist and Strömberg 2015) . The reason for this, according to the investigations, was that the organizations had limited knowledge of and experience with large-scale wildfires.
There is, however, a difference between public investigations and the affected views concerning the role of the extreme weather. The directly affected attached a crucial role to the extreme weather conditions (see Table 1 , statement #3) as a cause, whereas the government-commissioned investigation (Sjökvist and Strömberg 2015) clearly stated that the weather conditions made subsoiling a dangerous practice and should therefore have been included in the forest company's risk analysis. The public investigation also sees thisthe lack of risk analysis -as a general problem for the forest sector, whereas the directly affected mainly see that the wildfire was caused by an individual company's behavior. This result has implications for issues of accountability and processes for blame. Seeing an organization as fully or partly causing a disaster often means the organization is also seen as accountable for the disaster. A plausible interpretation is that the respondents saw the wildfire disaster as a result of a mix of human and natural factors (subsoiling and poor firefighting in combination with extreme weather), which also means that they were not as harsh as the public investigations in their strong criticism of the forest sector (Sjökvist and Strömberg 2015) , fire departments (Henningsson and Jacobsen 2014) and crisis management (MSB 2016). However, a decisive part of the issues of blame and accountability concerns the character and magnitude of the consequences of a disaster, which led to the second research question.
Consequences of the wildfire
The second research question addressed the consequences of the fire. What is striking is that the respondents stated that they had rather limited personal losses, mainly consisting of recreational losses (Table 3 ). Even if they were affected in terms of living in the fire area, owning property, or being evacuated, the respondents found their personal consequences to be rather modest. Most of the economic costs were lifted from the local level: the total cost for the fire (the emergency operations and the damages) was estimated to be at least 90 M euros (1000 M SEK), and the emergency operations were financed by the state (the municipalities got 25 M euros in compensation for the costs of the firefighting operations) and insurance companies (individual forest owners got about 35 M euros to cover their costs). In addition, the nature reserves were made possible through the state (offering either economic compensation or a new forest property in the vicinity for those owning forest in the newly established nature reserve). Moreover, the respondents attached a number of positive consequences -not least long-term character -to the wildfire (Table 4) . Thus, none of the main types of consequences of wildfires described in the introduction seem to apply here. A study even found that the social ties among the local population and the community identity were strengthened by the wildfire (Lidskog 2018) . The catastrophic situation in the acute phase -where the wildfire rapidly spread and no measures seem to put it under control, where the consequences seemed to be enormous, and where dramatic images filled the headlines of national and local media -seemed to serve as a yardstick when the respondents afterwards evaluated the consequences of the disaster, finding the consequences to be rather modest. In addition, the directly affected believed that the wildfire was good for biodiversity, which echoes well what has been stated by the Forest Agency and distributed by the media.
Furthermore, studies have shown that local responses are heavily dependent on the recovery phase, i.e. what happens in the aftermath of disasters, where not the least is that litigation processes over economic compensation foster distrust in governments and corporations (Erikson 1995; Freudenberg 2000) . In the case studied here, 75% of the damaged forest was insured for forest fires, and the remaining part was mainly owned by one large forest owner (who was less economically vulnerable than the small-scale owners). The litigation process -which is still ongoing -is not driven by individual forest owners or local residents, but by a national insurance company that has sued the forest company that caused the fire, claiming 25 M euros (277 M SEK) in damages for its payments to affected forest owners.
Evaluations of efforts during the fire
The third research question concerned the respondents' evaluation of the involved organizations' work during the fire. What is striking is the large variation in their assessments (Table 5) . Organizations working directly and very visibly in the acute phase are ranked high, probably because the respondents have a clearer picture of the work done by them (volunteer organizations and fire departments).
Another feature is that all organizations are evaluated rather positively, including the forest companies. The public investigations do not share this view in their evaluations of the work of the fire departments and crisis management, particularly during the first days when the fire was out of control. They reveal a picture of a general lack of management and coordination among the different local fire departments in the area and the public authorities. Limited knowledge of forest fire behavior and the forest fire index and limited experience with large forest fires are seen as the main causes that the firefighting and emergency services failed to sufficiently assess the risks (Henningsson and Jacobsen 2014; MSB 2016) . The governmental investigation is very clear on this point, stressing that there was a lack of preparatory action in the form of risk and vulnerability analysis, education, planning and practice, and capacity for crisis management (Sjökvist and Strömberg 2015) .
A plausible interpretation of the reason behind this difference in evaluations is that the respondents directly observed how organizations struggled to fight the fire, and even if they thought that the fire department and crisis management authorities contributed to the fire reaching a high level of severity, they also observed these organizations' strong efforts to bring the fire under control.
Learning from the fire
The fourth research question concerned the respondents' belief that organizations will learn from the wildfire. Most of the directly affected were confident that the fire departments will improve their firefighting ability (Table 6) , and this is consistent with their opinion that the fire departments will be better prepared to handle forest fires (Table 4) . They were, however, substantially less confident that other organizations (municipalities, the Forest Agency, the state and forest companies) will learn from the wildfire. Not least the forest companies stood out here, with more respondents having no or low confidence that the companies will learn than high confidence that they will do it.
This can be contrasted with the public investigations that heavily stressed the need for learning from this wildfire, not least in terms of improved crisis management of the forest sector and emergency services (Sjökvist and Strömberg 2015; MSB 2016) but also in terms of general knowledge of forest fires and techniques for fighting them (Henningsson and Jacobsen 2014) . Improved planning, coordination and training, as well as clarification of responsibilities in the general system of crisis management, were seen as needed to reduce the risks of forest fires in the future.
The directly affected having low confidence that the forest sector will learn does not influence what learning will, in fact, take place. In that sense, the respondents' views are of limited importance for learning but are more a sign of how the respondents evaluate the trustworthiness of the organizations and also their beliefs about whether organizations will change their routines to minimize risks for wildfires.
Wildfire risk in general
This leads to the fifth research question, which concerned the respondents' beliefs about the future risk of forest fires. The survey gives a complex picture. The most common response was the belief that risks for forest fires had increased in the last decades and will continue to do so in the future (Table  7) . Simultaneously, there was a rather widespread view that it is possible to minimize the risks for forest fires (only 13% disagreed with this statement, Table 7 ). An interpretation of this is that despite opportunities to decrease the risks for future wildfires, these opportunities will not be made use of. This could be related to the respondents' belief that the forest sector will not learn so much from this wildfire disaster (Table 6 ). At the same time, they did not see forest practices -the way forestry is conduced -as a major cause of forest fires in Sweden.
Furthermore, comparing the respondents' views on the causes of the wildfire disaster (Table 1) with their views of causes that will increase the risk for future wildfires (Table 7) shows that respondents believed that the fire departments will not, to any larger extent, cause large forest fires, whereas in the wildfire case of 2014, they attributed the fire departments a decisive role. A plausible interpretation is that they saw the fire departments' handling of the wildfire in 2014 as an exception -this is in sharp contrast to the public investigations' severe criticism of the fire departments (Henningsson and Jacobsen 2014) . In addition, the respondents had more trust in the fire departments than in the forest companies when it comes both to learning from the fire and to not increasing risks for wildfires in the future.
Disaster studies have shown that those organizations that cause a disaster are often thereafter attached a general public mistrust (Erikson 1995; Picou et al. 2004; Freudenberg et al. 2012) . In this case, the directly affected had a more differentiated view, where the fire departments were not blamed to any extent, whereas the forest sector was ascribed a more salient role in causing the disaster as well as not learning from it. A reason for this may be that the fire departments work in the acute phase where they were very visible (both directly and in the media) compared to other professional organizations.
Concluding remarks
The results of the survey provide a complex picture of how the people affected understood the wildfire, its causes and consequences, how organizations performed during the fire and the extent to which they will learn from the events, and future wildfire risks in Sweden. We argue that there are three central issues that need to be emphasized if we want to better understand the social impacts of wildfires.
First, how people understand a disaster is shaped by their prior experiences and available resources but also by their world views and frames, which create a set of expectations and sensitize people to some aspects more than others (cf. Cohn et al. 2008; Carroll et al. 2011; Kulig and Botey 2016) . These frames condense information and provide meaning to what has happened. Frames are not static but are also influenced by what has happened and how actors spread information about an event. This means that a disaster does not end when the fire is extinguished; it is followed by a much longer process of ecological as well as social recovery -which also influences how the disaster is understood and evaluated. The herestudied wildfire may be evaluated differently in the future, both by those living in the area and by forest companies and public agencies.
Second, a disaster is something that can be acted upon . Organizations and people facing a new and unintended situation have to do something; they have to respond to an acute situation. However, they can also learn from a disaster, and their actions may change their general views of disasters but also of society (Boström et al. 2018 ). Forest fire disasters can provide learning opportunities that can result in improved safety of forest operations and strengthened crisis management practices. A wildfire may also open up a "window of opportunity" (Doyle 1984; Kingdon 1984; Lidskog and Sjödin 2018) , that is, a situation appears where particular kinds of decisions and actions become possible. These decisions and actions may then become a substantial part of how a disaster is evaluated by people and stakeholders. For example, the wildfire opened up an opportunity to create a nature reserve resulting in a number of positive consequences (in terms of biodiversity and outdoor life but also in terms of obtaining new forest property in the vicinity).
Third, studying how affected people understand and evaluate a wildfire is needed to better understand the social consequences of a disaster at the local level, for those living in the affected area, but also for wider issues of their trust towards involved organizations and the general forest sector Abrams et al. 2015; Dickinson et al. 2015; Vallejo and Alloza 2015) . A forest fire, and how it is evaluated afterwards, may influence public attitudes towards forestry, in turn, generating indirect consequences, such as providing incentives for modified forest practices, regulatory changes and policy changes.
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